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ABSTRACT
Decades of overreliance on overincarceration have led to a 
growing sense of frustration and disillusionment with our criminal 
justice system. While legal scholars have long lamented this jail-first 
philosophy of punishment, some judges have recently joined in the 
fight by administering alternative criminal sentences to certain 
individuals. Among these alternative sentences are what are 
frequently referred to as public-shaming, or scarlet-letter, 
punishments. Because of the bizarre juxtaposition of novelty and 
archaism that shaming sentences present, these sometimes-
sensationalistic punishments have become a favorite of academia, 
news outlets, and certain judges. However, despite significant 
discussion on whether and to what extent public-shaming sentences 
work in achieving the traditional theories of criminal punishment, 
relatively little attention has been paid to why and how these 
punishments work.
The key to understanding how the traditional theories of 
criminal punishment, particularly those known collectively as 
consequentialist or utilitarian, can be satisfied by shame is in 
understanding the emotion itself. Because shame is an intense, easily 
recalled, easily tailored, and universal emotion that has a tendency 
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to compound over time, it is quite useful as a master emotion in 
altering or preventing criminal behavior in individuals. Perhaps 
more importantly from a practical standpoint, shame can satisfy 
nearly every theory of punishment just as well as, if not better than, 
jail. And although there are important policy concerns that arise 
from exhibiting an individual’s debased self to society, the well-
documented horrors of the American prison system should be more 
troubling to anti-shame advocates. 
Although much has been written on the subject of shame as a 
criminal punishment, the existing literature has largely fallen short 
of explaining why there is utility in shame. Accordingly, this Note 
addresses both the shortcomings and the misconceptions of the 
psychology of shame—as experienced universally and in American 
society—to demonstrate that shame is a master emotion that 
persuades behavior unlike any other emotion. This Note will 
consequently move the discussion of public-shaming sentences 
forward by providing a useful framework of understanding the very 
emotion that is sought to be elicited by these punishments and by 
demonstrating why shame has utility as a master emotion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not 
ashamed. . . . And when the woman saw that the tree was good . . . she 
took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with 
her; and he did eat. And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew 
that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made 
themselves aprons.1 
It is quite curious that in the creation myth upon which 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are built, seemingly the first 
emotion felt by Adam and Eve in a fallen world was shame.2 This is 
curious for two reasons. First, presumably any other negative 
emotion would have been suitable, given that Adam and Eve just 
caused the Fall of Man.3 Second, and more remarkably, they felt 
shame, a social emotion,4 at a time at which it appears they were the 
                                                 
 1. Genesis 2:25, 3:6-7 (King James) (emphasis omitted). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See, e.g., Karen Caplovitz Barrett, A Functionalist Approach to Shame 
and Guilt, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME, GUILT, 
EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE 25, 39-41 (June Price Tangney & Kurt W. Fischer 
eds., 1995) [hereinafter SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS] (“If humans did not live in 
social groups, there would be no need for [shame].”); Geoffrey M. White, 
Representing Emotional Meaning: Category, Metaphor, Schema, Discourse, in 
HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 30, 41 (Michael Lewis & Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones 
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only two humans on earth.5 Putting aside questions of the account’s 
factual accuracy, there is something to be learned from this Genesis 
story: Shame is central to the human experience.6 
In light of this, it is unsurprising that shame has historically 
played a role in criminal punishment.7 Further, shaming sentences 
have experienced a renaissance in some American courts in recent 
decades.8 Much of this resurgence in shaming punishments is due to 
a growing frustration with the American penal system and its 
overreliance on incarceration.9 It is thought by some that public-
shaming sentences can “serve as a politically viable and cost-
effective way of achieving deterrence, specific and general, as well 
as of satisfying the legitimate demands of retribution.”10 However, 
there are others who would suggest that public shaming as 
punishment is either ineffective11 or unconstitutional.12 
This Note addresses the rise of the use of public-shaming 
sentences as well as the swell of criticism that has met it. Some 
question whether shaming sanctions can offer more than “a purely 
                                                                                                       
eds., 2d ed. 2000) (commenting on “the largely social and moral significance of 
shame”). 
 5. See Genesis 2:22-4:1; J. David Velleman, The Genesis of Shame, 30 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 27 (2001), reprinted in J. DAVID VELLEMAN, SELF TO SELF: 
SELECTED ESSAYS 45, 45-46 (2006) (“There was no preexisting culture to 
disapprove of nakedness or to enforce norms of dress.”). 
 6. MICHAEL LEWIS, SHAME: THE EXPOSED SELF 85 (1992) (noting shame’s 
“importance” and role as “the focal emotion in the Genesis creation story”). 
 7. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal 
Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1906-15 (1991) (highlighting shaming punishments in 
Japan, Inuit cultures, Southern Spain, the Tobriand Islands, and Colonial America); 
Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, 
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes’ 
Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1533-34 (1996). 
 8. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame 
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1056 (1998) (recognizing “scattered reappearance 
of shame sanctions in the United States”). 
 9. See Massaro, supra note 7, at 1882; Kenneth Shuster, Halacha as a 
Model for American Penal Practice: A Comparison of Halachic and American 
Punishment Methods, 19 NOVA L. REV. 965, 966 (1995) (stating “America’s 
punishment system is not working”). See generally John Conyers, Jr., The 
Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 377 (2013). 
 10. Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 733, 738 (1998). 
 11. See generally Massaro, supra note 7, at 1917-44. 
 12. See, e.g., Phaedra Athena O’Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of 
Shame: An Analysis of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to 
Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions, 77 N.C. L. REV. 783, 862 (1999). 
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retributive slap . . . and a feeble form of criminal justice.”13 That is, 
there is significant doubt as to whether there is any utility in shame 
sentencing. The otherwise extensive literature on shaming falls short 
of adequately explaining precisely why there is utility in shaming 
sanctions.14 This Note accordingly seeks to fill those gaps by 
proposing that shame is a master emotion that has utility in 
effectively altering actual and potential criminal behavior and can 
thus satisfy the utilitarian theories of punishment.15 
Part I looks at the resurgence of public-shaming sentences over 
the last few decades, as well as some important constitutional 
questions that have arisen as a result. Part II examines the traditional 
theories of criminal punishment. Part III then looks to the 
psychology of shame, how the emotion is shaped by society, and 
how it affects individuals. Lastly, Part IV analyzes precisely why 
there is utility in shaming sentences by demonstrating that shame can 
effectively alter individual behavior and satisfy the traditional 
justifications for criminal punishment. 
I. RESURRECTING THE PILLORY: THE FALL AND RISE OF PUBLIC-
SHAMING SENTENCES 
Shame has played an important role in many cultures 
throughout the history of civilization, from ancient Judaism16 to pre-
                                                 
 13. Massaro, supra note 7, at 1936. 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 1935-36 (arguing, in part, that only retributive ends can 
be achieved by shaming sanctions because American society cannot actively 
reintegrate the offender); Garvey, supra note 10, at 775-94 (arguing generally that 
punishment should educate according to the principle of lex talionis and that 
shaming sentences do not always do this); Whitman, supra note 8, at 1061-62 
(conceding that shame as punishment may achieve utilitarian ends, but not 
explaining why this is the case); Rosalind K. Kelley, Comment, Sentenced to Wear 
the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentencing—Are They Constitutional?, 93 
DICK. L. REV. 759, 778-83 (1989) (addressing theories of punishment, but not 
explaining how they apply to shame sanctions). 
 15. I owe much to Professor Adam Candeub for pointing me in the 
direction of researching and writing about the utility of shame, and even for giving 
me the idea that shame is a “master emotion.” The importance of his oversight and 
guidance of this Note cannot be overstated. 
 16. See Shuster, supra note 9, at 971-86 (discussing the various forms of 
Halachic punishment in ancient Judaism). Shuster also speaks to the aims of specific 
and general deterrence in Halachic corporal punishment performed before a crowd. 
Id. at 982. 
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World War II Japan,17 pre-modern Europe18 to contemporary China,19 
and nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russia20 to Taliban-ruled 
Afghanistan.21 Shame was also the punishment of choice in pre-
Colonial America.22 There were a number of ways in which the pre-
Colonial American could be shamed for his transgressions.23 Yet 
shame as punishment had fallen decidedly out of favor by the end of 
the eighteenth century, due in large part to the rise of the penitentiary 
system.24 What once may have been a necessary evil to deter criminal 
                                                 
 17. Massaro, supra note 7, at 1906-10 (citing cultural anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict’s work on the country that led to the conclusion “that shame was ‘the root 
of virtue’” in Japan because of the “acute sensitivity to insult and to dishonor to [sic] 
one’s name” (quoting RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD 224 
(1946)); see also Kazuo Miyake & Kosuke Yamazaki, Self-Conscious Emotions, 
Child Rearing, and Child Psychopathology in Japanese Culture, in SELF-CONSCIOUS 
EMOTIONS, supra note 4, at 488, 488-95 (discussing the place of shame, guilt, and 
embarrassment in Japanese culture). 
 18. See generally Antonella Bettoni, Fama, Shame Punishments and the 
History of Justice in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in SHAME, BLAME AND 
CULPABILITY: CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN THE MODERN STATE 32 (Judith Rowbotham, 
Marianna Muravyeva & David Nash eds., 2013) [hereinafter SHAME, BLAME AND 
CULPABILITY] (observing that shaming sentences were effective because of the 
centrality of community to everyday life, but that shaming became less workable 
when community foundations eroded). 
 19. Whitman, supra note 8, at 1055 (taking note of the “common 
knowledge . . . that public humiliation of a dramatic sort was featured in the law of 
Maoist China” and the newer, lesser-known sanctions that allow economic criminals 
to be “trucked around town wearing signs describing their offenses”). 
 20. See generally Natalia Pushkareva, Shaming Punishments of Women in 
Russia in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in SHAME, BLAME AND 
CULPABILITY, supra note 18, at 168 (describing the punishment for a woman 
convicted of adultery that consisted of her being stripped, severely beaten, and 
driven through crowded streets by an official with a whip). 
 21. Whitman, supra note 8, at 1056 (noting the media’s attention to 
“humiliation rituals” in Islam generally, and Afghanistan specifically). 
 22. See Massaro, supra note 7, at 1912-15. 
 23. Among the options for those inflicting the punishment were the 
admonition, a public confession in which the wrongdoer sought forgiveness; the 
classic donning of the sign or scarlet (or any other color, for that matter) letter; 
branding or maiming; the bilbo, a shackled iron bar; and the pillory. Id. at 1912-14 
(citing, in large part, ALICE MORSE EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS 
(1896)). 
 24. See Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal 
Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1179-81, 1220-46 
(1982) (using Massachusetts as an example of the larger transition to a preference 
for incarceration in American criminal jurisprudence). 
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behavior among offenders and the masses was replaced with the new 
hope of a workable prison system.25 
A. Clever Judges and the New Shaming Sentences 
The pitfalls of overreliance on incarceration have become 
readily apparent in recent decades.26 Taxpayer burden,27 danger to 
inmates,28 the tendency to make criminals even more dangerous,29 
                                                 
 25. See id. at 1191-92. 
 26. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 7, at 1884-85 (citing the argument that 
there is a question as to “the effectiveness and humanity of prison” and pointing out 
that parole is equally troublesome because of society’s desire to punish and 
incapacitate criminals); Conyers, supra note 9, at 377-79 (speaking generally to the 
causes and problems of overincarceration); Saby Ghoshray, America the Prison 
Nation: Melding Humanistic Jurisprudence with a Value-Centric Incarceration 
Model, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 313, 317 (2008) (arguing that 
overincarceration has led to a devaluation of human capital by eroding our values); 
see also Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and the 
Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 851-52 (2009) (asserting that 
imprisonment redraws lines of citizenship, which leads to inequality); Alfred 
Blumstein, Incarceration Trends, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 95-96 (2000) 
(noting the “phenomenal incarceration binge” in the United States beginning in the 
1970s). 
 27. See, e.g., Barry C. Scheck, Mandatory Madness, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 
2005, at 4, 10 (“Federal incarceration costs taxpayers . . . $ 4 billion annually.”). 
 28. See, e.g., James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The 
Supreme Court and Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C. L. REV. 433, 433 (2003) 
(describing rape in prison); Christopher D. Man & John P. Cronan, Forecasting 
Sexual Abuse in Prison: The Prison Subculture of Masculinity as a Backdrop for 
“Deliberate Indifference,” 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 127, 127 (2001) (labeling 
rape as “a terror that is far too common for tens of thousands of inmates in American 
correctional institutions”); David M. Siegal, Note, Rape in Prison and AIDS: A 
Challenge for the Eighth Amendment Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1541, 1542 (1992) (“The combination of AIDS and rape within our prisons 
thus poses a dilemma: any man sent to prison confronts, from the first moment he is 
incarcerated, the Kafkaesque prospect of brutal attack by another inmate and 
infection with one of the world’s most deadly diseases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 29. Todd R. Clear, Backfire: When Incarceration Increases Crime, in THE 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INCARCERATION 1, 12-14 (1996), available at 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/uci.pdf (discussing the 
indirect contributions of prison to an increase in crime through negative impacts on 
“families and children, neighborhood order, and social inequality”); Martin H. 
Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1108 (“[T]he 
pervasive utilization of incarceration [] may be causing more crime than it is 
preventing.”); Shuster, supra note 9, at 966 (“[The] prevalence of recidivism 
suggests that many criminals are more dangerous when they leave prison than when 
they enter.”). 
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and a disproportionate effect on minorities30 have led many to 
question the centrality of imprisonment in the American criminal 
justice system.31 Tough-on-crime campaigns and minimum-
sentencing statutes have exacerbated these problems.32 In response to 
the limitations of prison sentences, some judges are now handing 
down alternative sentences that seek to shame the offender.33 
Generally speaking, shaming sentences create “[c]onditions which 
label a defendant’s person or property [and] have a stigmatizing 
effect.”34 These sentences can range from the benign to the bizarre. 
For instance, one Cleveland man convicted of making threats to 
the police was punished by, in addition to ninety days in jail, having 
to hold a sign that apologized to the officers and read, “‘I . . . [was] 
being an idiot . . . and it will never happen again.’”35 The judge noted 
that “sometimes she ‘has to get creative to get through to people.’”36 
A few months earlier, the same judge sentenced a woman who drove 
on a sidewalk around a school bus to wear a similar “idiot” sign.37 
                                                 
 30. See, e.g., Conyers, supra note 9, at 379-83 (explaining causes of over-
incarceration, especially the disparate impact on African-Americans); Jennifer M. 
Cox, Frequent Arrests, Harsh Sentencing, and the Disproportionate Impact They 
Have on African Americans and Their Community, 3 S. REGION BLACK L. STUDENTS 
ASS’N L.J. 17, 18 (2009) (illustrating inequality in the prison system by pointing out 
that blacks and Latinos are jailed at higher rates despite lower rates of drug use); 
Steve Rickman, The Impact of the Prison System on the African Community, 34 
HOW. L.J. 524, 526 (1991) (“Our incarceration rate, especially looking at the 
incarceration rates of our minority population in the nation . . . is the highest in the 
world outside of South Africa . . . .”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral 
Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1271, 1274 (2004) (“The massive scale of black citizens behind bars is matched in 
its enormity by the rate of black imprisonment.”). 
 31. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. 
 32. See Blumstein, supra note 26, at 95 (“It’s easy for a politician to show a 
scene of him slamming the prison cell door shut and thereby fixing the crime 
problem.”); Scheck, supra note 27, at 4 (calling mandatory minimum sentencing “an 
unfair, senseless and wasteful disgrace”). 
 33. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 35-47. 
 34. People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 1997). 
 35. Doyle Murphy, Ohio Man Ordered to Carry ‘Idiot’ Sign After 
Threatening Cops, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 3, 2013, 1:50 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/truth-advertising-man-carries-idiot-
sign-threats-article-1.1444524. 
 36. Lindsay Jolivet, Ohio Man Ordered to Wear “Idiot” Sign After 
Drunken 911 Call, DAILY BUZZ, (Sept. 4, 2013), https://ca.news.yahoo.com/ 
blogs/daily-buzz/ohio-man-ordered-wear-idiot-sign-drunken-911-151143098.html 
(quoting Judge Pinkey Carr). 
 37. See id.; Jordan Chittley, Ohio Woman Wears “Idiot” Sign for Driving 
on Sidewalk to Pass School Bus, DAILY BUZZ (Nov. 14, 2012), 
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One observer, whose daughter rode that same bus, stated, “‘[S]he 
needs to be humiliated like this.’”38 
Another Ohio man caught soliciting the services of a prostitute 
was forced to wear a chicken suit as his punishment.39 The judge in 
charge of his sentencing also sentenced a woman to a night alone in 
the woods for abandoning dozens of kittens in winter.40 The judge 
has stated that jail and fines do not always work and that his shaming 
sentences deter crime.41 There is also an element of variability when 
shaming sentences are an option.42 
Shaming is not limited to just minor crimes, though. A Houston 
man who killed another while driving under the influence was forced 
to wear a sign explaining the accident, at the scene of the accident, 
for a total of thirty-two hours.43 Like the Cleveland man who 
threatened police officers,44 this was in addition to a ninety-day 
prison sentence.45 This led one of the victim’s friends to observe that 
the punishment was not nearly severe enough, considering the 
serious nature of the crime.46 Even the judge expressed concerns over 
merely putting the defendant on “shock probation.”47 
The idea of shaming as punishment has also been spotted in the 
financial world. In response to the “London Whale” incident in 
which J.P. Morgan lost over $6 billion of investors’ money, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, and Justice Department all sought apologies to 
consumers in addition to settlements.48 This, however, is not 
                                                                                                       
http://ca.news.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-buzz/ohio-woman-wears-idiot-sign-driving-
sidewalk-pass-201218583.html. 
 38. Id. (quoting Lisa Kelley). 
 39. Andrea Canning, Commit a Crime, Do the Time—in a Chicken Suit, 
ABC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id= 
3467505&page=1#.UAh_YGgTvJx. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Olivia Katrandjian, Drunk Driver Made to Wear Sign Saying He Killed 
a Man, ABC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
blogs/headlines/2012/04/drunk-driver-made-to-wear-sign-saying-he-killed-a-man/. 
 44. See Murphy, supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 45. Katrandjian, supra note 43. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. See Danielle Kurtzleben, For J.P. Morgan, Sorry Could Be the Hardest 
Word, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 21, 2013, 5:18 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/21/for-jp-morgan-sorry-could-be-
the-hardest-word. 
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something to which J.P. Morgan readily acquiesced.49 The rationale 
behind J.P. Morgan’s reluctance to apologize is that an apology can 
lead to dire financial repercussions later in time.50 It is thought that 
the damage done to a company’s reputation through forced apologies 
is analogous to shaming an individual, where the individual’s 
reputation is harmed.51 
B. A Right Not to Be Embarrassed? Shaming Sentences and the U.S. 
Constitution 
Shaming’s renewed prevalence in criminal and civil, personal 
and corporate, and lesser and more severe contexts is apparent from 
just a handful of examples.52 Also apparent is the rationale for these 
punishments.53 What may be less obvious, though, are the 
constitutional questions that arise as a result of these peculiar 
sentences. However, several courts and many legal scholars have 
dealt with these issues. 
One of the most cited of these cases54 is Goldschmitt v. State.55 
In Goldschmitt, the appellant sought to overturn a condition of 
probation that required him to place a bumper sticker on his car that 
stated he was convicted of driving under the influence.56 The court 
first dismissed the appellant’s First Amendment argument,57 noting 
that the bumper sticker served as a statement of fact, not ideology, 
                                                 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. (citing John Coffee, Adolf C. Berle Professor of Law at 
Columbia Law School). 
 51. See Companies “Named and Shamed” for Bad Behavior (NPR radio 
broadcast Mar. 7, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/ 
transcript.php?storyid=124357844. 
 52. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 53. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 54. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 10, at 735 n.10; Massaro, supra note 7, at 
1887 n.42; Ryan J. Huschka, Comment, Sorry for the Jackass Sentence: A Critical 
Analysis of the Constitutionality of Contemporary Shaming Punishments, 54 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 803, 816 (2006); Kelly, supra note 12, at 791; Barbara Clare Morton, 
Note, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and into the Light—”Scarlet Letter” 
Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern America Because It 
Deprives Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 116 n.160 (2001); 
Persons, supra note 7, at 1568 n.236. 
 55. 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam). 
 56. Id. at 124. 
 57. The defendant’s First Amendment argument was that he was being 
forced to broadcast an ideological message on his vehicle, which the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled against in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). Goldschmitt, 490 
So. 2d at 125. 
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and that it served “as a form of penance and a warning to other 
potential wrongdoers.”58 The court also brushed aside the appellant’s 
Eighth Amendment claim59 by distinguishing between the “physical 
rigors of the pillory” and the mere affixation of a bumper sticker.60 
However, the court did leave open the possibility that certain degrees 
of humiliation might merit constitutional protection.61 
Another state case out of California also dealt with the 
constitutionality of a shaming sentence.62 In People v. McDowell, the 
appellant, convicted of stealing a woman’s purse,63 argued that being 
forced to wear tap shoes whenever he left his house was cruel and 
unusual punishment.64 The court dismissed this argument, taking 
note of the sentencing judge’s latitude in creating appropriate 
sentences.65 Despite the finding of constitutionality, the court did 
remand,66 reasoning that the condition of probation was too 
imprecise.67 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed 
shaming and the Constitution in United States v. Gementera.68 The 
trial court sentenced the defendant to wear a sign for one day outside 
the post office; the sign said, “‘I stole mail. This is my 
punishment.’”69 The sentencing court stated that the “experience 
should have a specific rehabilitative effect on defendant that could 
not be accomplished by other means, certainly not by a more 
                                                 
 58. See Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125.  
 59. The Eighth Amendment argument stated that being forced to apply the 
bumper sticker was sufficiently similar to pre-colonial shaming and that most would 
think that such a punishment would be cruel and unusual according to modern 
sensibilities. Id.  
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 126 (“[W]e are unable to state as a matter of law that 
Goldschmitt’s bumper sticker is sufficiently humiliating to trigger constitutional 
objections . . . .”). 
 62. People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842-43 (Ct. App. 1976). 
 63. Id. at 841. 
 64. Id. at 842-43. 
 65. Id. at 843 (“Merely because a condition is out of the ordinary does not 
make it constitutionally unreasonable. One of the advantages of probation as an 
alternative to confinement is that its terms can be tailored by the court to fit the 
individual defendant.”). 
 66. Id. at 844. 
 67. Id. at 843 (noting that requiring the defendant to wear tap shoes at all 
times could keep him from safely participating in a number of athletic activities and 
that requiring him to wear the shoes only as he exits his home would be pointless). 
 68. 379 F.3d 596, 608-09 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 69. Id. at 598. 
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extended term of imprisonment.”70 That court also pointed to both 
specific and general deterrence as reasons for the shaming sentence.71 
On appeal, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the 
sentence solely on Eighth Amendment grounds.72 Recognizing that 
the Eighth Amendment must keep pace with “‘evolving standards of 
decency,’”73 the court found that the sentence was not cruel and 
unusual.74 
The Supreme Court has also had occasion to explore public 
shaming, though in a different and more limited context.75 In Smith v. 
Doe, the Court looked at an Alaska statute that required some 
previously convicted sex offenders to register as sex offenders.76 The 
respondents argued that this was a violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause77 and that the result of the notification provision of the statute, 
which required publishing of the respondents’ information on the 
Internet, was analogous to pre-colonial public shaming.78 However, 
the Court found that the statutory requirement was not sufficiently 
similar to pre-colonial sentences and that the requirement was not 
punitive in nature because it only required dissemination of 
information.79 Because of this, the regulation was not a violation of 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.80 
The handful of state and federal appellate courts that have 
examined public-shaming sentences or regulations have almost 
                                                 
 70. Id. at 602 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 607. The amicus to the case, however, challenged the condition 
based on the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well. Id. Nevertheless, the 
court refused to consider those issues since the court generally “‘do[es] not consider 
on appeal an issue raised only by an amicus[,]’” id. (quoting Swan v. Peterson, 6 
F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1993)), and the defendant did not adopt the amicus’s 
arguments, id. at 608. 
 73. Id. at 608 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 74. Id. at 610 (emphasizing that this is especially the case when compared 
to the realities of prison). 
 75. See generally Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 76. Id. at 90. 
 77. Id. at 91. An ex post facto law is one that applies retroactively. See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (10th ed. 2014). 
 78. Smith, 538 U.S. at 91, 97-98. 
 79. Id. at 98-99 (“[T]he State does not make the publicity and the resulting 
stigma an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.”). 
 80. Id. at 105-06. Interestingly, though, the Alaska Supreme Court ended up 
finding that the provisions violated the state’s ex post facto clause. Doe v. State, 189 
P.3d 999, 1019 (Alaska 2008) (reasoning that the effects of the statute are in fact 
punitive). 
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uniformly found them constitutional.81 The arguments against the 
constitutionality of shaming sentences may be meritorious. However, 
there is a growing body of case law that rejects these arguments.82 
C. Public Shaming: Constitutional? Probably. Good Policy? 
Debatable. 
While public-shaming sentences almost certainly 
constitutional,83 there are some who question whether public-
shaming sentences are good policy even if not “cruel and unusual.”84 
Shaming’s merits already have been discussed to some extent,85 but 
there are legitimate concerns about shaming’s potential drawbacks 
regarding the indifference for human dignity and the effect of shame 
on society’s notions of justice. Because the focus here is on the 
utility of shame—that is to say, the net benefit of shame to society—
these policy considerations are certainly worth exploring. 
1. Debasing Dignity 
A primary concern of those opposed to shaming is the basic 
dignity of humans, which may be jeopardized by the exposition of a 
criminal’s transgressions.86 In the words of one scholar, “The cruelty 
of shame sanctions, it might be said, . . . [is that] they violate the 
offender’s dignity in some objectionable way—that they run contrary 
to some deep norm requiring us to treat even criminals with 
                                                 
 81. In fact, the Gementera court stated that it was “aware of no case holding 
that contemporary shaming sanctions violate our Constitution’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.” United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 609 (9th 
Cir. 2004); see also Whitman, supra note 8, at 1057 n.15 (citing that the rule from 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), which does not recognize a liberty or property 
interest in reputation alone, may be an absolute bar to a finding of 
unconstitutionality for shame sanctions, and further pointing out that “most courts 
that have considered the issue have validated shame sanctions”). 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 54-80. 
 83. This is not to say that all shaming sentences will always be 
constitutional; it is likely that the seventeenth-century brand of shaming would be 
“cruel and unusual” by today’s constitutional standards since the “[Eighth] 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 85. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 86. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 7, at 1936-43. 
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respect.”87 In more civilized societies, even criminals should be 
entitled not to be humiliated.88 
Further, some would argue, “‘[O]ther things being equal, we 
should prefer punishments that do not entail stigma and loss of 
liberty to those that do.’”89 Since shaming is characterized by its 
“stigmatizing effect” on offenders,90 it is less preferable to alternate 
sentences that would not have such an effect. While an affront to an 
individual’s dignity as a human may occur collaterally to any sort of 
punishment, including the more traditional method of incarceration, 
it is argued that this affront cannot be the primary objective of an 
enlightened government to shame the offender.91 
                                                 
 87. Whitman, supra note 8, at 1068-69. 
 88. AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 262 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 
1996) (“Every human being, even a criminal, is entitled to the respect granted to 
humans because they are human.”); Mark Spatz, Comment, Shame’s Revival: An 
Unconstitutional Regression, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 827, 834 (2002) (citing 
MARGALIT, supra, at 262) (noting that all human beings should be respected in the 
society that strives to be decent). 
 89. Massaro, supra note 7, at 1936 (quoting HERBERT L. PACKER, THE 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 255 (1968)). 
 90. People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 1997). 
 91. See Whitman, supra note 8, at 1068-69 (citing the argument that 
deprivation of liberty and property are within the ambit of a liberal government’s 
powers, but deprivation of dignity is not). Interestingly, the European Court of 
Human Rights has alluded to this same point. See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13, 16 (1978). In Tyrer, a fifteen-year-old boy was hit with a 
stick on his bare buttocks by a police officer in private as punishment for assaulting 
a classmate. Id. at 3-4. The court applied Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, id. at 17, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading 
punishment. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 3, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005. The court 
stated that treating the criminal “as an object in the power of the authorities” was in 
direct conflict with the purpose of Article 3, “namely a person’s dignity and physical 
integrity.” Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13. Seemingly, the court could argue 
by extension that shaming sentences are equally degrading. This would appear to be 
significant to the United States since the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the United States is a party, has an analog to the 
European convention. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, 
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. If the European court’s 
rationale were applied to the U.N. Covenant, as is often the case, then it would be 
binding on the Untied States. However, the United States made a reservation when 
signing the ICCPR that Article 7 would be interpreted in accordance with the Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Id. at United States of 
America Reservation 3. Thus, even if the ICCPR were understood to mean that 
public-shaming sentences were a violation of Article 7, this would not bind the 
United States for the reasons stated above. See supra Section I.B. 
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2. “Are You Not Entertained?”92: The Impact of Shaming 
Sentences on Society 
Furthermore, the barbarism of shame taken too far is something 
that even the nonlegal observer can grasp. A raucous crowd that is 
too enmeshed in the punishment of another is understandably not 
desirable to many.93 Perhaps scenes of the arenas in the film 
Gladiator,94 the torture scene at the end of Braveheart,95 or even the 
racking of a Disney protagonist in The Hunchback of Notre Dame96 
come to mind. 
While even those most critical of shame sanctions would 
probably not predict this drastic a return to a less enlightened time, it 
is arguable that punitive regression will inevitably lead to societal 
regression.97 After all, if the abandonment of shaming as punishment 
was symptomatic of a larger trend towards social decency,98 then it 
seems reasonable to assert that a revival of shame necessarily 
forebodes a revival of uncouth society. Additionally, shaming 
sentences made on the whims of a bored judge trying to make 
headlines would likely lead to an undesirable justice system.99 
While these policy concerns are perfectly legitimate, it must be 
asked whether the currently preferred method of punishment—
incarceration—respects individual dignity or positively reinforces 
societal decency any better than shaming sanctions.100 Regarding 
                                                 
92.  GLADIATOR (DreamWorks SKG & Universal Pictures 2000). 
93.     Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Bradley G. Silverman, Hayek and the 
Citation of Foreign Law, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 99-103 (discussing “the [m]adness 
of [c]rowds”). 
 94. GLADIATOR, supra note 92. 
 95. BRAVEHEART (Icon Entertainment International 1995). 
 96. THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME (Walt Disney Pictures 1996). 
 97. See generally, e.g., MARGALIT, supra note 88; Spatz, supra note 88; 
Whitman, supra note 8. 
 98. See WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE 
SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 
(Ginn & Co. 1940) (1906) (observing that public punishment and societal indecency 
were directly related); Whitman, supra note 8, at 1074-75 (citing SUMNER, supra). 
 99. Some Judges Prefer Public Shaming to Prison (NPR radio broadcast 
Aug. 24, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/08/24/215097279/some-
judges-prefer-public-shaming-to-prison (citing arguments of Jonathan Turley, 
Professor at George Washington University Law School). 
 100. This obviously reduces the debate to an oversimplistic dichotomy 
between prison on one hand and shame on the other. The grander discussion for the 
way to best and most justly punish certainly needs to be more nuanced than this, but 
for the purposes of this Note, shame sanctions are most easily and usefully 
compared with incarceration. 
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individual dignity of the offender, reliance on incarceration seems 
the less favorable and humane option when one thinks of the 
prisoners as being “caged like animals.”101 As to the society dynamic, 
it is highly questionable that sending individuals away to jail cells 
and forgetting about them makes for a better society than active, or at 
least passively cognizant, participation in the individuals’ 
punishments.102 To address these concerns more productively, 
though, it is necessary to examine how society justifies punishing 
criminals. 
II. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 
For practically any criminal sentence to be considered 
effective—or just—it needs to satisfy some traditional justification 
of punishment.103 Broadly speaking, there are two classifications of 
punishment justification: retributivist and utilitarian.104 Retributivism 
is a justification in itself, whereas there are several justifications 
under the utilitarianism umbrella. 
A. Retributivism 
The theory of retributivism essentially states that a criminal is 
to be “punishe[d] because, and only because, [he] deserves it.”105 
                                                 
 101. Garvey, supra note 10, at 760 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. Cf. Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic 
Perspective on Megan’s Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 410 (2005) (suggesting 
that community meetings about sex offenders seeking to reintegrate in the 
neighborhood can maintain the offender’s level of shame while simultaneously 
encouraging a constructive environment that eases the transition). But see Massaro, 
supra note 7, at 1935-36 (arguing that American society lacks the mechanisms to 
reintegrate offenders effectively). 
 103. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.01 (6th ed. 
2012) (“The criminal justice system . . . inflicts pain on persons . . . by taking their 
life, liberty, and/or property. Any system that intentionally causes such suffering 
requires a justification.”). 
 104. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 3-34 
(2001) (exploring the competing philosophies of utilitarians—though called 
“consequentialists” here—retributivists, and abolitionists; abolitionists represent a 
new class of theorists and are thus not classical or mainstream). 
 105. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, 
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); DRESSLER, supra note 103, § 2.03(B)(1); DUFF, 
supra note 104, at 20-21; Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of 
Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1313, 1315 (2000).  
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Because retributivism is focused only on the nature and severity of 
the crime, punishment needs to be proportional to the offense 
committed.106 The classic metonymy “[an] eye for [an] eye”107 is 
often employed to explain retributivism.108 In the modern American 
context, crime is “an offense against the state. . . . [T]he harm to be 
redressed is the injury to society,” and it is thus society that must be 
satisfied with the punishment.109 
Under this theory, it is not necessarily a bad thing if there are 
broader repercussions as to deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
incapacitation, but those consequences are not to be taken into 
account when meting out the punishment.110 Part of the appeal of 
retributivism is its relative simplicity in application since extraneous 
conditions, such as the net benefit or detriment to society, need not 
be considered.111 Moreover, retributivism satisfies the almost 
instinctual understanding that bad people deserve proportionally bad 
things to happen to them.112 
This is not to say that retributivism is an unrefined philosophy 
used only to appease the barbaric masses.113 Retributivist advocates 
also point out that retributivism is the only “‘valid philosophical 
premise upon which a coherent, organized system of just punishment 
can be built” since it is the only one “concerned exclusively with 
                                                 
 106. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment 
Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 571, 590-92 (2005) (discussing proportionality in retributivism and different 
theories on how proportionality is to be achieved). 
 107. Exodus 21:24. 
 108. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 80 n.14 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing a study that showed that 37% of proponents for capital 
punishment gave the “eye for an eye” reason as the basis for their support); Chad 
Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 125-26 (2010) (noting the 
common perception that this entails revenge on an offender). 
 109. Massaro, supra note 7, at 1891 (footnote omitted). 
 110. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of 
“Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 859-60 (2002) (noting that retributivism 
does not concern itself with positive repercussions in punishing individuals). 
 111. Although, it is debatable that contemporary criminal sentencing 
adequately reflects society’s interests. If the redress is to be determined by society, 
application can be rather difficult given society’s complexities. 
 112. DUFF, supra note 104, at 23-26 (discussing punitive emotions). 
 113. See Robert A. Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal 
Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 397-98 (1979) (“[R]etribution is that theory of 
punishment that most consciously seeks to fashion a just societal response to 
adjudicated criminal wrongdoing.”). 
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doing justice.’”114 Thus, for instance, a prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment is necessarily retributivist since it does not look 
to the utility of these kinds of punishments.115 That is, because this 
prohibition necessarily requires proportionality, the Eighth 
Amendment will invariably satisfy retributivist ends but not 
necessarily utilitarian ends. Consequently, there is less of a 
possibility that criminal sentences will be abused in the name of 
retributivism than in the name of utilitarian ends.116 
To take recent Supreme Court jurisprudence as an example, 
retributivist principles have made life without parole an 
impermissible sentence for minors, regardless of the crime.117 
Because the Eighth Amendment requires “‘graduated and 
proportioned [punishments]’ to both the offender and the offense,”118 
the wrongdoer’s youthfulness needs to be taken into account when 
crafting a punishment.119 On the other hand, utilitarian aims could 
justify life without parole, or even the death penalty, for minors.120 
Therefore, although retribution initially appears to be the least 
compassionate theory of punishment, in practice it can lead to more 
humane sentences.121 
                                                 
 114. State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 635 (Utah 1997) (quoting Pugsley, 
supra note 113, at 381); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441-42 
(2008) (deciding that “imposing the death penalty for child rape [when the child did 
not die as a result] would not further retributive purposes” since the punishment 
sought was more severe than the underlying crime). 
 115. See Gardner, 947 P.2d at 634-35 (addressing theories of punishment as 
applied to Utah’s analogue of the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution); see also United States v. Angiulo, 852 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Mass. 
1994) (noting that, though facially vengeful, “‘an important element of retributivism 
is proportionality’” (quoting Molly Fairchild James, The Sentencing of Elderly 
Criminals, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1025, 1043 (1992))). See generally Pugsley, supra 
note 113 (arguing that only retributivism can justify criminal punishments). 
 116. See, e.g., Pugsley, supra note 113, at 399-400 (noting that utilitarian 
theories treat the individual wrongdoer as an object to be manipulated for the gains 
of society). 
 117. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 118. Id. at 2463 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)). 
 119. See id. at 2475. 
 120. See infra Section II.B. 
 121. See Pugsley, supra note 113, at 403-04. 
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B. Utilitarianism 
Unlike retributivism, utilitarianism is focused on the overall 
effect of punishment on society.122 Thus, if more net harm is done by 
a severe punishment that may be well deserved by retributivist 
standards, then a lesser punishment is ideal; conversely, a 
disproportionately severe punishment could also satisfy utilitarian 
concerns in some cases.123 Theoretically, a purely utilitarian system 
of justice could allow murderers to go free and gum thieves to spend 
twenty years in jail.124 The remainder of this Section will examine 
each utilitarian end in turn. 
1. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation, once a preferred theory of punishment, has 
largely fallen out of favor.125 The idea behind rehabilitation is to 
reform the offender so that he will not offend in the same way 
again.126 Although rehabilitation is similar to specific deterrence127 in 
its ultimate aims, rehabilitation differs in its methods by focusing on 
reforming the offender rather than seeking to make offending outside 
her economic interests.128 The appeal to this justification is its moral 
and humane aims in making bad people into better people.129 It is 
problematic, however, because rehabilitation does not necessarily 
satisfy society’s demands for justice and because “the practical 
                                                 
 122. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 103, § 2.03(A)(1); DUFF, supra note 
104, at 3-7; ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 2.4 (3d ed. 2004); 
Christopher, supra note 110, at 855-56. 
 123. However, Jeremy Bentham—the father of utilitarian theory—argued 
that the infliction of punishment is always a wrong, so it can be administered only 
when the good it does outweighs the evil. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1970); see also Donald A. Dripps, Rehabilitating 
Bentham’s Theory of Excuses, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 383, 388 (2009) (citing 
BENTHAM, supra). 
 124. See generally Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: 
Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115 (2000). 
 125. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 7, at 1894 (“Rehabilitation theory gained 
popularity in the United States during the late 1800s, and dominated penal 
philosophy during most of the 1900s.”). See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE 
DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981). 
 126. CAMPBELL, supra note 122, § 2:4. 
127. See infra Subsection II.B.3. 
 128. DRESSLER, supra note 103, § 2.03(A)(2). 
 129. CAMPBELL, supra note 122, § 2:4. 
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complexity, coupled with the extreme moral complexity, of 
refashioning human character to cabin or obliterate criminal instincts 
overwhelmed reformers.”130 
In fact, Congress has explicitly legislated against the aims of 
rehabilitation when imposing prison sentences.131 The U.S. Code 
provides “that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 
promoting correction and rehabilitation.”132 The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed this prohibition in Tapia v. United States133 by finding that 
a sentencing court cannot impose or lengthen a prison term for the 
promotion of rehabilitation.134 It must be kept in mind that neither 
Congress nor the Court has found rehabilitation to be a completely 
misguided aim for punishment;135 in fact, Congress has rejected such 
an assertion outright.136 However, because imprisonment has become 
the punishment of choice in America’s criminal justice system, 
rehabilitation is rendered a nullity in a large proportion of criminal 
cases, at least at the federal level. 137 
2. Incapacitation 
The justification of incapacitation stems from the community’s 
desire to feel safe from dangerous individuals.138 Normally this is 
achieved by physically restraining an individual,139 but it may also be 
accomplished by otherwise preventing the offender from committing 
future crimes.140 Like deterrence and rehabilitation, incapacitation 
seeks to prevent future crimes, but it focuses instead on the outward 
constraints placed on the individual, not her inward economic or 
                                                 
 130. See Massaro, supra note 7, at 1894. 
 131. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2012). 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). 
 133. 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). 
 134. Id. at 2391. 
 135. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76-77 (1983)). 
 136. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76-77). 
 137. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text. 
 138. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal 
Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 536, 541-43 (2006). 
 139. E.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: 
PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 3 (1995). 
 140. The oft-cited, though rare, example of this is the chemical castration of 
sexual predators. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: 
Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 561 (2006). Another common example is the electronic 
tether worn by an individual on house arrest. 
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moral calculations.141 This theory is unsatisfying to some, though, as 
it could justify not punishing someone if he does not pose a future 
risk to society.142 
The converse is also true; one curious phenomenon that has 
resulted, in part, from the demand of incapacitation as a justification 
for punishment is the appearance of “three-strikes” laws,143 most 
notably in California.144 These laws are fairly self-explanatory: If an 
individual commits a felony, having already been convicted of two 
felonies, he must receive what might otherwise be an overly harsh 
prison sentence.145 A rather extreme application of California’s three-
strikes law made its way to the United States Supreme Court in 
Ewing v. California.146 In Ewing, the defendant received twenty-five 
years to life in prison for stealing three golf clubs priced at a total of 
$1,197.147 The Court affirmed the conviction by deferring to the 
state’s police power and holding that the punishment was “not 
grossly disproportionate,” thus not violating the Constitution.148 The 
theory of incapacitation as a justification for criminal punishment, 
while understandable for the social benefit of peace of mind, can 
thus lead to sentences incongruous with a system of punishment that 
seeks to achieve just results. 
                                                 
 141. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text; infra notes 149-53, 
160-62 and accompanying text. 
 142. DUFF, supra note 104, at 5 (noting that incapacitation is useless to the 
consequentialist if it does not reduce the overall rate of crime). 
 143. See generally Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes 
Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 
GEO. L.J. 103 (1998). 
 144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2012). 
 145. See, e.g., id. (mandating whichever is greater between a trebly long 
sentence and twenty-five years for any third felony committed after two violent or 
serious felonies); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1(a) (West 2003) (mandating life 
without parole for certain violent felonies); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (2014) 
(mandating life without parole for certain violent felonies); WASH. REV. CODE. 
§§ 9.94A.030, 9.94A.570 (2012) (requiring life without parole for “persistent 
offender[s]” who commit a “most serious offense”). 
 146. 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 147. Id. at 17-18, 20. 
 148. Id. at 30-31. 
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3. Specific Deterrence 
Specific deterrence theory seeks to prevent repeat offenses.149 
The idea is that the punishment is designed to the extent that it will 
prevent a criminal from committing other offenses in the future by 
showing the severity of the consequences.150 This justification is 
rooted in the liberal tradition that assumes rational, cost-weighing 
actors will see that crime does not pay and consequently will not 
commit subsequent crimes.151 Few would argue that the prevention of 
crime is an unworthy goal; however, this theory’s opponents are 
quick to point out the difficulty in preventing crimes that have yet to 
occur.152 There is also the unfortunate reality that not all individuals 
are rational, or alternatively, that there is no potential punishment 
that can outweigh a given individual’s interest in committing a given 
crime.153 
The New Jersey case of State v. O’Neill154 nicely illustrates how 
specific deterrence can work in practice. In this case, an individual 
who had a history of abusing alcohol was convicted of “vehicular 
homicide while intoxicated within 1,000 feet of school property.”155 
The trial judge also tacked on an additional year in jail to the 
recommended sentence, citing both general and specific 
deterrence.156 The appellate court initially remanded the conviction 
for the trial judge to consider whether specific deterrence alone could 
justify the additional year.157 Because the trial judge found that the 
defendant had abused alcohol and driven drunk in the past, the judge 
                                                 
 149. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME 
AND JUSTICE 1282, 1286-87 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002), as reprinted in 
JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL 
LAW 35 (6th ed. 2012). 
 150. E.g., DUFF, supra note 104, at 4-5. 
 151. Massaro, supra note 7, at 1896 (pointing out that the assumption that 
criminals are rational actors pursuing utility may be misguided). 
 152. E.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of 
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 
1517-18 (1974). 
 153. Pugsley, supra note 113, at 392 (noting that critics of deterrence theory 
have pointed out that Bentham’s “rationalistic calculus of pleasure and pain . . . [is] 
for many types of crimes and criminals . . . at best, irrelevant, and, at worst, a 
dangerous myth”). 
 154. No. 00-12-00383-I, 2006 WL 1413440 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 
24, 2006). 
 155. Id. at *1. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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found specific deterrence as both necessary and sufficient for the 
elevated term of imprisonment.158 Essentially, because the defendant 
had shown that alcohol abuse was in his individual interest, a more 
severe punishment was required to deter him specifically than would 
be necessary to deter others.159 
4. General Deterrence 
In contrast, general deterrence theory seeks to prevent similar 
offenses from being committed by members of society other than the 
criminal.160 Like specific deterrence, there is an assumption inherent 
in this justification that members of society are rational actors 
seeking to maximize their interests; by observing the woes of a 
particular offender, other community members are less likely to 
commit that offender’s same crime.161 Also like specific deterrence, 
general deterrence is an unpredictable justification for punishment, 
practically speaking.162 
Perhaps where punishments based on general deterrence are 
most effective is in the context of white-collar crimes.163 This is 
generally because of the unique nature of white-collar crimes, which 
do not require incapacitation for security purposes or specific 
deterrence for future acts, and because retributivist principles are a 
bit trickier to apply when the harm is purely economic.164 In United 
States v. Turner, for instance, the defendant used rubber stamps with 
doctors’ signatures to falsify test results for his “cardiovascular 
testing operations.”165 The trial court stated that general deterrence 
was the most suitable justification for his eighteen-month prison 
sentence, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, despite the defendant’s 
                                                 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. CAMPBELL, supra note 122, § 2:2. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Schulhofer, supra note 152, at 1517-18. 
 163. See, e.g., United States v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 47 (1st Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 164. See United States v. Turner, 173 F. App’x 402, 404 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(citing the lower court’s reasoning that “none of the community protection, specific 
deterrence, or retribution justifications for punishment apply in this case,” and that 
“prison sentences are especially important for deterring white-collar crime”). 
 165. Id. at 403-04. 
438 Michigan State Law Review  2015:415 
protestations that general deterrence was an invalid end in criminal 
sentences according to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.166 
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME 
When exploiting an individual’s emotions to inflict 
punishment, it is presumably best practice to try to understand the 
psychology behind the emotion.167 If the psychology of shame is not 
properly understood, then it would be difficult to craft suitable 
shaming sentences on a routine basis.168 Thus, it is unlikely that 
absent an understanding of shame’s psychology, any of the theories 
of punishment can be consistently satisfied through shaming 
sentences. This Part will accordingly examine the psychological 
effects of shame on an individual. 
A. The Lessening of the Self 
One of the primary characteristics of the emotion of shame is 
that it causes the individual to think less of herself.169 Thus, she 
would think, “I did this bad thing; therefore, I am bad.”170 The 
individual also feels a sense of being exposed to the judgment of 
others.171 This “highly negative and painful state . . . results in the 
disruption of ongoing behavior, confusion of thought, and inability to 
                                                 
 166. Id. at 407-08. 
 167. E.g., Nathan Harris, Shaming and Shame: Regulating Drink-Driving, in 
SHAME MANAGEMENT THROUGH REINTEGRATION 73, 75 (Alfred Blumstein & David 
Farrington eds., 2001) (“The failure to find research on shame that presents a 
consistent answer to questions about its role in reintegrative shaming . . . suggests 
that understanding shame is also an important psychological question.”). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Harald G. Wallbott & Klaus R. Scherer, Cultural Determinants in 
Experiencing Shame and Guilt, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS, supra note 4, at 465, 
466-67. 
 170. June Price Tangney, Shame and Guilt in Interpersonal Relationships, in 
SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS, supra note 4, at 114, 115-17 (citing HELEN BLOCK 
LEWIS, SHAME AND GUILT IN NEUROSIS (1971)).  
 171. GÜNTER HARRY SEIDLER, IN OTHERS’ EYES: AN ANALYSIS OF SHAME 37 
(Andrew Jenkins trans., 2000) (noting that many writers on the subject have found 
that “the situation of being judged [i]s an intrinsic feature of the shame affect”). 
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speak.”172 Such results can then in turn cause the individual to feel an 
even greater sense of shame.173 
Moreover, this sense of diminished self-worth tends to last with 
an individual.174 However, while the emotion of shame may seem to 
encompass the entire self, at least for a short time, it is actually only 
linked with the thing that made the individual feel shamed in the first 
place.175 Thus, the fourteen-year-old boy whose voice cracks in front 
of the entire class may still feel some embarrassment as a twenty-
year-old man recalling the experience; however, he will not feel less 
self-worth as a man, though he likely did as a boy. The same goes if, 
instead of the boy’s voice cracking, his teacher ridiculed him in front 
of the entire class; he is likely to recall the incident with humiliation, 
but probably will not feel like a worse person because of the 
recollection. 
While the exact process by which the feeling of shame comes 
to last with an individual is complex, it is a fairly straightforward 
concept.176 The scene in which the individual experiences his 
shame—the “encompassing visual, auditory, and kinesthetic 
dimensions”—is internalized.177 That imagery is then imprinted with 
the sense of shame that accompanied the situation.178 It is as though 
the self attaches its own “scarlet letter” to the memory. Once this 
happens, “the self is now entirely capable of reproducing shame.”179 
Additionally, shame is magnified and made more intense over 
time.180 
                                                 
 172. Michael Lewis, Embarrassment: The Emotion of Self-Exposure and 
Evaluation, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS, supra note 4, at 198, 210. 
 173. Velleman, supra note 5, at 58 (“Having blushed can . . . be an occasion 
for blushing again.”). 
 174. Jack Katz, The Elements of Shame, in THE WIDENING SCOPE OF SHAME 
231, 235 (Melvin R. Lansky & Andrew P. Morrison eds., 1997) (“As long as it 
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 175. JULIEN A. DEONNA, RAFFAELE RODOGNO & FABRICE TERONI, IN 
DEFENSE OF SHAME: THE FACES OF AN EMOTION 104-07 (2012) (arguing that shame 
is “[s]evere but not all-encompassing”). 
 176. GERSHEN KAUFMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME: THEORY AND 
TREATMENT OF SHAME-BASED SYNDROMES 57 (2d ed. 1996). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 55. 
 180. Id. From Doctor Kaufman’s perspective, the increased intensity of 
shame, coupled with the spreading of shame through the self, is analogous to a 
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It is also worth noting that shame differs from guilt because 
guilt causes the wrongdoer to focus more on the action itself and not 
on his worth as a human.181 This translates to the individual thinking, 
“I did this bad thing; therefore, I committed a wrongful act for which 
I must atone.”182 Because the foci with shame and guilt are different, 
the actions caused by the emotions also differ; whereas guilt tends to 
motivate an individual to try and make amends, shame has the 
unpredictable tendency to make the individual either shrink away or 
lash out.183 However, while the shame–guilt dichotomy is significant 
for psychological purposes, it is probably not all that significant for 
legal purposes.184 Either emotion can likely be elicited by what are 
more generally known as “shame” sentences.185 
B. A “Hot” Emotion 
The next characteristic implicit in shame is one that likely any 
person knows intuitively: It is an intense, “hot” emotion.186 Chances 
are, the reader can remember in greater detail the exact 
circumstances and feelings associated with any number of 
embarrassing moments than, say, the single best meal she has ever 
had.187 The feeling is almost inextricably tied to the event.188 This led 
Keats to observe, “The most unhappy hours in our lives are those in 
which we recollect times past to our own blushing. If we are 
immortal, that must be the Hell. If I must be immortal, I hope . . . to 
forget some of my school-boy days, and others since those.”189 It is 
                                                                                                       
malignant cancer. Id. at 55-56. It is thus rather unlikely that he would agree that 
American society should utilize shame to punish criminals. 
 181. Barrett, supra note 4, at 26-28. 
 182. See Tangney, supra note 170, at 117. 
 183. Id. at 117-18. 
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more acute emotion than guilt. Wallbott & Scherer, supra note 169, at 476. 
 186. Wallbott & Scherer, supra note 169, at 473. 
 187. Interview with Adam Candeub, Professor of Law, Mich. State Univ. 
Coll. of Law, in East Lansing, Mich. (Sept. 11, 2013). 
 188. Id.; see also supra Section III.A. 
 189. Letter from John Keats to John Hamilton Reynolds (Apr. 27, 1818), in 
THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN KEATS 110, 110 (Lord Houghton ed., 1867). 
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no surprise that most shame or embarrassment stories are highly 
context- and circumstance-specific.190 
The heat of shame is not merely hot as an emotional 
phenomenon, but it manifests itself physically as well.191 In addition 
to a literal increase in temperature, an individual’s verbal 
communicability is impaired as a result of shame.192 Avoidance of 
eye contact also accompanies the emotion, and efforts to suppress the 
urge to break eye contact, or even not to blush, can result in 
experiencing even greater shame.193 Because so much of the 
internalization of shame is dependent on imagery,194 the physical 
manifestations of the emotion of shame may contribute to the 
intensity of the memory of the circumstances.195 
C. Shame as Shaped and Limited by Culture 
On his face there was not a blush nor a trace of shame. He was too far 
from the social state, and too near the state of nature, to know what shame 
was.196 
While shame is perhaps a nearly universal emotion,197 it is not 
experienced in universally the same way or to the same extent.198 
                                                 
 190. White, supra note 4, at 41 (citing Dorothy Holland & Andrew Kipnis, 
American Cultural Models of Embarrassment: The Not-So Egocentric Self Laid 
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 198. See, e.g., Wallbott & Scherer, supra note 169, at 465-83 (discussing the 
differences of causes and experiences of shame in different cultures). But see 
Richard A. Shweder, Toward a Deep Cultural Psychology of Shame, 70 SOC. RES. 
1109, 1109 (2003) (“When it comes to the meaning of the emotions, ‘shame’ is 
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This is because culture plays a large part in determining what is 
shameful and how intensely one should feel shame.199 Culture and 
socialization are important to the development of shame because 
they give standards and norms significance.200 For instance, as one 
might expect, the average American twenty-something is unlikely to 
feel shame for the same reasons or to the same extent as the average 
Japanese twenty-something.201 
Nevertheless, even though shame is shaped by culture, shame 
is not necessarily created by culture. Indeed, the manifestations of 
shame are first seen in even the youngest babies,202 and a toddler can 
fully experience shame.203 Some argue that it is in fact “a necessary 
part of human life.”204 Accordingly, shame is a “master emotion” 
because of its bearing on the individual’s conscience, tendency to 
communicate problems in one’s relationships, and “role in regulating 
[one’s] expression.”205 
Furthermore, it can be argued that even if shame were a purely 
cultural phenomenon, “American society is a shame-based 
culture.”206 In fact, contrary to the arguments of many,207 shame may 
be even more potent in American society.208 This is because shame is 
hidden, and thus taboo, in American culture.209 It is the taboo that 
makes Americans act as though shame does not exist, not an absence 
                                                                                                       
‘shame,’ whether it is experienced on the East Coast of India or on the Upper West 
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 202. PENTTI IKONEN & EERO RECHARDT, THANATOS, SHAME, AND OTHER 
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Wallbott & Scherer, supra note 169, at 481-82. 
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Societies 1 (May 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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or lack of shame in the culture.210 Therefore, because shame is a 
cultural taboo, there is shame in feeling shame; the initial shame is 
compounded by the secondary shame that is felt for having felt 
shame in the first place.211 Thus, the difference between America as a 
guilt society and Japan as a shame society is misleading, as they are 
both shame-based societies. The difference between America as a 
shame society and Japan as a shame society is that the Japanese 
overtly organize around shame, whereas Americans try to sweep it 
under the rug.212 
D. Shame and Morality 
Although “shame feels bad to the person experiencing it,” this 
does not keep shame from having a positive moral impact.213 Rather, 
the pain of experiencing shame “highlight[s] the importance of 
meeting standards.”214 One line of thought is that shame only plays, 
or ought to play, a role in the societal standards that are moral in 
nature.215 Others think that shame is heteronomous, meaning that it is 
merely the disapproval of others that causes the emotion, not the 
disapproval as it relates specifically to moral standards.216 Even if 
shame is a heteronomous emotion, some would argue that this is in 
fact a good thing, since moral standards are a construct of the 
community.217 
                                                 
 210. KAUFMAN, supra note 176, at 46; see also Thomas J. Scheff, Shame in 
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Experience would tend to suggest that shame is not an 
inherently moral emotion.218 For instance, the boy whose voice 
cracked in front of the class will likely feel the “hot,” prolonged 
lessening of the self that shame entails, even though one’s transition 
into adulthood is clearly an amoral experience. Further, shame may 
accompany experiences over which an individual has no control.219 
While the adolescent could have not spoken in front of the class, he 
had no control over his cracking voice once he did talk. Thus, shame 
is not a moral emotion per se, though it certainly can be utilized as 
such. 
Shame is a complex emotion that is still not fully understood.220 
However, one thing that can be distilled from the many intricacies of 
the emotion is that shame is a central feature of the human 
experience. The nuances of the emotion complement its centrality to 
make shame an effective mechanism for altering behavior.221 This 
makes shame an effective instrument in the context of criminal 
sentencing. 
IV. THE UTILITY OF SHAME 
Shaming sentences are both effective punishments and good 
policy. Assuming that public-shaming sentences are generally 
constitutional,222 they work because shame is effective in altering the 
behavior of individuals. Because of this, shaming sentences 
adequately satisfy the traditional theories of punishment and do so 
far better than the more common alternative: prison.223 
                                                 
 218. See Manion, supra note 213, at 74 (“Placing shame centrally in the 
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 219. Id. 
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A. Why Shaming Works 
Shame is effective in altering behavior because it is a “master 
emotion.”224 It was, according to the Genesis myth, the first negative 
emotion felt in a fallen world.225 Perhaps no other feeling could 
motivate behavior the way that shame does. In the context of 
criminal justice, no one would take seriously a sentence that sought 
merely to elicit the wrongdoer’s emotion of anger, say, by insulting 
his mother. Yet sentences that seek to elicit shame or guilt are 
gaining steam because of the nearly universal recognition that they at 
least might work. 
1. Intensity 
The first reason that these sentences work is because of 
shame’s intensity.226 The focus of shame on the self is acute and 
painful, which immediately causes the individual to seek refuge from 
the stares of others.227 The all-too-familiar sense of wishing to be 
anywhere but within the judging gaze of one’s peers is the effect 
sought by public-shaming sentences.228 Although it is true that there 
are some for whom shaming is not a viable option,229 “the number of 
such completely disaffected and therefore shameless people is 
probably smaller than [we] . . . think.”230 Furthermore, the act of 
shaming forces the emotion of shame onto even those who would not 
normally feel it.231 Thus, for the majority of the population, shaming 
is likely to elicit a strong emotional response. 
It could be argued, though, that the intensity of shame, coupled 
with the tendency of the shamed individual to either lash out or 
withdraw from society,232 would actually be counterproductive. 
Reasonably, one who lashes out is likely to engage in behavior that 
while not necessarily criminal, could potentially lead to further 
criminal behavior. Likewise, one who withdraws and broods over her 
                                                 
 224. Scheff & Retzinger, supra note 205, at 4. 
 225. See Genesis 2:25. 
 226. See supra discussion Section III.B. 
 227. Lewis, supra note 172, at 210; Tangney, supra note 170, at 117-18. 
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shaming could be ostracized from society; this is unlikely to decrease 
her criminal inclinations. 
However, it is more likely that the intensity of shame will tide 
future criminal behavior, even if shame is accompanied with the 
initial desire to lash out or shrink away. According to Jeremy 
Bentham, “Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human 
action.”233 More simply, people will do what gives them pleasure and 
avoid what brings them pain. Thus, because shame is such an intense 
and painful emotion for most, it is one that most individuals will seek 
to avoid. Presumably, this desire will outweigh the immediate desire 
to lash out at or withdraw from society. 
2. Ease of Recollection 
Moreover, the feeling of shame is easily recalled, and it is 
inexorably tied to the situation that caused it.234 Thus, the prostitute 
solicitor forced to wear a chicken suit235 is likely to relive the sharp, 
painful feelings he experienced each time he recalls his punishment. 
One could make the argument that because the recollection of shame 
is dependent on the circumstances in which it was initially felt,236 the 
feeling of shame would be attached only to the punishment, not the 
crime. Certainly shaming sentences are of little use if the powerful 
emotion of shame is not in any way cognitively connected with the 
underlying offense in the mind of the offender. 
However, it only takes one logical inference from the convicted 
to associate the punishment—and its attendant shame—with the 
crime.237 In other words, the negative emotions of shame and guilt 
are attached to the underlying crime vicariously through the 
punishment of the crime. This strength of psychological association 
is probably lost when the offender has weeks or months to spend in 
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jail and experience an array of thoughts and emotions, most of which 
will not be as acutely painful as shame.238 
3. Individualization 
Partly because of the proximate association between the 
emotion of shame and the punishment, and between the punishment 
and the underlying crime, shaming sentences can be—and perhaps 
must be—more neatly tailored to the individual than a mandatory-
minimum statute.239 For instance, requiring a gang member to merely 
advertise his aggravated assault could have the adverse effect of 
rewarding the individual and his affiliates with “street cred.” 
Requiring him to advertise his crime while wearing a hand-knit 
kitten sweater, though, would be particularly shameful for one so 
immersed in a culture of machismo.240 
However, one of the more compelling arguments against 
shaming sentences is in response to precisely this possibility. The 
latitude judges have in crafting these sentences could lead to judicial 
abuse of power.241 This could lead to a farcical, if not dangerous, 
justice system in which perpetrators of relatively minor crimes are 
subjected to the harassment of the masses simply because the judge 
felt bored on a given day. As an extension, it would be even more 
worrisome if shaming were to become the norm for the punishment 
of minor crimes. Nevertheless, while these concerns are facially 
legitimate, there is no indication that the judges who have imposed 
shame sanctions have so far abused their discretion in doing so.242 
Further, there has not yet been any indication that shaming sentences 
have had any adverse effects other than the ones they are designed to 
have as punishment for a crime.243 
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Another argument against shame-as-punishment is that, even 
with the power that judges have in tailoring the sentences, a judge is 
not qualified to do so.244 An individual’s innumerable intricacies can 
affect how well a sentence will work, if at all.245 This argument has 
little merit, though. Certainly a judge must hand down some kind of 
sentence to an offending individual. Even a half-hearted shaming 
sentence that takes into account one or two traits of an individual is 
more tailored to that individual than a blanket ninety-day jail 
sentence, for instance.246 Indeed, the judge responsible for forcing the 
johns to wear chicken suits247 and the animal abuser to sleep in the 
woods248 cited his ability to craft a box-of-chocolates type of 
sentencing policy as a reason for lower crime rates in the area.249 
4. Universality 
Shaming is also particularly effective as punishment because of 
its near universality.250 Shame is an emotion experienced by almost 
every person on earth, regardless of culture, and this human 
experience can first occur in infancy.251 This universality is important 
for two reasons. The first is because it guarantees that some kind of 
shaming sentence can be created to suit nearly everybody.252 While 
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folly to argue, “Since X has not been proven to be true, X must be untrue”; however, 
this argument carries some weight when one considers the proven deleterious effects 
of current system of overincarceration. That is, while shaming has not been 
empirically shown to have adverse social consequences, the American reliance on 
incarceration has. See generally, e.g., Conyers, supra note 9 (speaking generally 
about the problem of over-incarceration). 
 244. Massaro, supra note 7, at 1920 (“[T]he more effective the shaming, the 
more counterproductive it may become. The judge thus would need to predict both 
the offender’s individual susceptibility to shame and her likely post-shaming 
behavior. Each factor in turn might vary with the nature of the offense, the nature of 
the shaming sanction, and pre- and post-conviction environmental, and other 
offender-specific conditions.”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Though the jail sentence might, for some, be a perfectly tailored 
punishment. 
 247. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
 248. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
 249. See Canning, supra note 39. 
 250. See LEWIS, supra note 6, at 2 (“Shame [i]s [e]verywhere.”); White, 
supra note 4, at 41. 
251. See supra Section III.C. 
 252. Cf. KAUFMAN, supra note 176, at 29 (stating that “‘[t]he experience of 
shame is inevitable for any human being,’” which indicates that a shaming sentence 
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this does not necessarily mean that shaming sentences will always be 
practicable, viable options, it does mean that when they are, they 
have a relatively high likelihood of working.253 
The second reason that universality is important is because of 
the effect it can have on others. Because nearly all individuals have 
experienced shame at some point, they can empathize with one 
currently being humiliated. Assuming the reader has attended law 
school, it is probably not difficult to recall a situation in which a 
professor cold-called an unprepared peer; likely, the reader can also 
probably recall “feeling bad for” the peer.254 However, despite 
incredibly high incarceration rates,255 the majority of the American 
public cannot empathize with one who is currently spending time in 
jail because most Americans have not been to jail.256 The forced 
interaction between society and an offender through shaming 
sanctions, coupled with the ability of nonoffending individuals to 
identify with the one being shamed, make shaming sentences 
effective. 
5. The Shame Spiral 
A final reason why shame is so effective in altering behavior is 
the idea, to mongrelize Shakespeare, “It will have [shame], they say: 
[shame] will have [shame].”257 Because shame is not only prevalent 
in America, but also taboo, the mere experience of feeling shame is 
in itself shameful.258 Thus, the individual who has shame forced upon 
                                                                                                       
can be crafted for nearly any human being (quoting TOMKINS, supra note 197, at 
185)).  
 253. See generally Michele Pifferi, Individualization of Punishment and the 
Rule of Law: Reshaping Legality in the United States and Europe Between the 19th 
and the 20th Century, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 325 (2012) (discussing the idea that 
individualization of sentences can produce better results in deterring and reforming 
criminal behavior). 
 254. Those who are especially empathetic may have even felt the physical 
manifestations of the emotional phenomenon of shame. See supra notes 191-95 and 
accompanying text. 
 255. See generally, e.g., Conyers, supra note 9. 
 256. Though dated, one study suggests that 5.1% of U.S. residents will spend 
time in prison at some point in their lives. THOMAS P. BONCZAR & ALLEN J. BECK, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR 
FEDERAL PRISON 1 (1997), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Llgsfp.pdf. 
 257. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 3, sc. 4, l. 121 
(Eugene M. Waith ed., rev. ed. 1954). Macbeth, of course, states here, “It will have 
blood, they say: blood will have blood.” Id. 
 258. KAUFMAN, supra note 176, at 46. 
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her for her transgressions will feel the shame for the transgression259 
and for having felt that shame in the first place. The pain of shame 
therefore burns longer and hotter, both in the moment and in the 
recollections of the moment that occasioned the shame. 
B. Shame’s Satisfaction of the Traditional Theories of Criminal 
Punishment 
Because of shame’s effectiveness as a master emotion in 
altering human behavior, it can adequately satisfy any traditional 
theory of punishment. Most of the legal literature seems to be in 
agreement that shaming, whatever its other drawbacks, can meet 
retributivist ends.260 Far more disagreement surrounds whether shame 
can satisfy the utilitarian theories, though, and few authors have 
offered cogent explanations as to why or how it achieves utilitarian 
ends.261 
1. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is perhaps the most difficult utilitarian theory of 
punishment to reconcile with shaming sentences. The object of 
rehabilitation is to prevent a convicted criminal from committing 
future crimes by changing his moral inclinations.262 Shame, however, 
is not an inherently moral emotion, as it can be experienced in 
completely amoral situations over which the individual has no 
control.263 In the context of public shaming as a criminal sentence, 
however, shame will likely be understood to have a moral 
component by both the offender and the observer. By forcing shame 
                                                 
 259. See supra Subsections IV.A.1-4. 
 260. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 7, at 1936 (stating that shaming sentences 
offer little more than a “purely retributive slap by an unforgiving and impersonal 
authority, and a feeble form of criminal justice”); Whitman, supra note 8, at 1062 
(calling shame sanctions seemingly “beautifully retributive”). But see generally Dan 
Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the 
Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001) 
(arguing against the seeming consensus that shaming satisfies the retributivist 
theory). One must also bear in mind that shaming sentences do not inherently meet 
retributivist ends. As an example, the Texas man forced to a cumulative of thirty-
two hours of shaming after taking the life of another was not justly punished 
according to retributivists. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47. 
 261. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra Subsection II.B.1. 
 263. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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upon the offender,264 the sanction will “highlight[] the importance of 
meeting [societal] standards.”265 Although it is nearly impossible to 
say with certainty that shaming can serve a rehabilitative purpose, 
there is at least the possibility for rehabilitation to be achieved 
through shame sanctions. 
Importantly, while shame cannot guarantee rehabilitation, 
shame can almost assuredly promise rehabilitation with more 
certainty than the alternative of incarceration. Prisons are notorious 
for making individuals into worse people, leading to high recidivism 
rates;266 this is the antithesis of what rehabilitation seeks to achieve. 
Shaming sentences, on the other hand, have at the least not been 
proven to be as counterproductive to rehabilitative aims, although 
such cases have been too few and scattered to empirically prove that 
shaming is more effective in rehabilitating. In any event, and 
precisely because of this uncertainty attendant to rehabilitation, this 
theory of punishment has fallen out of favor among many.267 
2. Incapacitation 
The theory of incapacitation is that placing outward constraints 
on an individual prevents future crimes, regardless of whether the 
person’s morals or economic interests are affected.268 The most 
obvious—and concededly, the most effective—form of 
incapacitation is incarceration. Society can rest easier knowing that 
violent men and women are behind bars, unable to harm anyone but 
other prisoners or guards. Even still, shaming sentences can 
incapacitate.269 Armed guards may accompany an individual forced 
to wear a sign in a public forum. There is also a more artificial 
incapacitation that results from societal disapproval; for instance, a 
thief who is forced to buy a TV advertisement may be recognized by 
shop owners, who will ensure he does not steal anything from their 
stores. 
                                                 
 264. Even those who might normally be more shame resistant will feel the 
emotion if it is forced upon them. Velleman, supra note 5, at 64-65. 
 265. Barrett, supra note 4, at 41. 
 266. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra Subsection II.B.1. 
 268. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
 269. Massaro, supra note 7, at 1900 (“[S]haming sanctions may have a 
disabling effect on the offenders, and thus may claim to serve incapacitation-type 
ends.”). 
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Admittedly, these are pretty anemic attempts at incapacitation 
when compared to the near absoluteness of incarceration. Perhaps an 
important question to ask, though, is not about the extent of 
incapacitation, but the nature of the individual when he is not 
incapacitated. An otherwise nonviolent man is far more likely to 
become violent as a result of jail time than an eight-hour day of 
embarrassment.270 Thus, the actual safety created by incapacitation 
by shame may outweigh the perceived safety created by 
incapacitation by incarceration. 
3. Specific Deterrence 
Perhaps the strongest case for the utility of shame as 
punishment is in its application to the theory of specific deterrence. 
Specific deterrence seeks to prevent future crimes by causing the 
individual to see that the net pain of punishment outweighs the net 
pleasure of committing a crime.271 Shaming sentences work because 
of the intensity and longevity of the emotion of shame. Because 
shaming sentences are typically only administered for fairly minor 
crimes, the intensity of the pain of shame is likely to outweigh the 
pleasure of engaging in a minor crime. Take for instance the woman 
forced to hold a sign proclaiming her idiocy after driving on the 
sidewalk around a school bus.272 Presumably, the hours forced to 
hold the sign, and the pain of shame that accompany the experience, 
outweigh in her mind the seconds saved by cutting around a stopped 
school bus. 
It must be noted that the theory of specific deterrence presumes 
rationality on the individual as an economic actor seeking to 
maximize her interests;273 one wonders, though, how rational the 
woman is to begin with when she endangered the lives of children 
for an incrementally faster commute.274 This is a significant concern. 
However, this concern addresses the theory of specific deterrence as 
a whole, and not just as applied to shame sanctions. If the woman is 
not a rational actor, then no form of punishment will make her one. 
Alternatively, specific deterrence may still be a viable end, but the 
                                                 
 270. Cf. supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting that prisons breed 
violence). 
 271. See supra Subsection II.B.3. 
 272. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra Subsection II.B.3. 
 274. See Pugsley, supra note 113, at 392 (noting that not all individuals are 
rational actors, thus making deterrence theory inapplicable in some cases). 
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scales would be weighted. That is to say, in order to deter, it would 
take a substantial outweighing by the pain of the perceived 
pleasure.275 
The question then becomes whether jail time or shame time can 
achieve this better. A typical ninety days in jail would appear to be a 
hefty price to pay; however, a swath of emotions and memories will 
likely accompany a ninety-day stint in jail, perhaps even positive 
ones at certain points. Shaming, on the other hand, has the sole end 
of producing shame, the master emotion. Because of this, in addition 
to evidence that incarceration does not specifically deter,276 public-
shaming sentences are more likely to achieve this utilitarian end. 
4. General Deterrence 
Also compelling is the case for shame in generally deterring 
criminal behavior. The theory of general deterrence suggests that 
individuals not being punished will find it in their economic interests 
not to commit a crime because of the punishment of another.277 That 
is to say that “‘[p]unishment can act as a preventative only when the 
idea of it, and of its connexion with the crime, is present to the 
mind.’”278 Applied to a shame sanction, an individual who observes 
another man wearing a chicken suit as punishment for soliciting a 
prostitute279 will observe the other man’s shame and conclude that 
visiting a prostitute is not worth the end humiliation. Likewise, a 
bank that sees Chase’s coerced apology280 will conclude that the 
potential for lost business from a similar apology would outweigh 
the potential for gain from illegal or corrupt practices.281 The emotion 
                                                 
 275. We must always be mindful, though, of the Eighth Amendment’s 
proportionality requirements. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) 
(stating that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
forbids “sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed”). 
 276. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra Subsection II.B.4. 
 278. Garvey, supra note 10, at 779 (quoting 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles 
of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 403 (John Bowring ed., 
Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1843)). 
 279. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 280. See text accompanying notes 48-51. 
 281. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(asserting that general deterrence is particularly effective in white-collar cases); 
United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 47 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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of shame works in generally deterring crime because of its 
universality.282 
Because nearly everyone knows the pain of shame—magnified 
by its taboo in American culture—nearly everyone can vicariously 
feel the humiliation of the one being shamed. This empathy cannot 
be as readily elicited by the knowledge that some people are locked 
away in jail somewhere. The power of shame as a master emotion 
will thus guide an individual not to pursue the same criminal path as 
the other who is forced to endure shame. 
CONCLUSION 
Public-shaming sentences have a long history in Anglo-
American law and beyond. Because of increasing frustration with 
American overreliance on incarceration, shaming sentences have 
reappeared in the United States in recent decades, albeit in more 
sensible forms than their pre-colonial forebears. However, despite a 
glut of literature on the subject, and numerous conclusions that 
shaming sentences are a positive trend, few have offered viable 
explanations of precisely why these sentences have any utility 
beyond achieving purely retributivist ends. These punishments, 
though controversial, are effective because the emotion they seek to 
elicit—shame—is a master emotion that plays a central role in 
altering behavior. Because of shame’s status as a master emotion, 
public shaming can deter further crimes, as well as rehabilitate the 
offender. Shaming sentences thus satisfy any traditional theory of 
punishment while being far less socially costly than incarceration. 
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